Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index Up Week Ended 3/7/08

The CS21 Net Net Index closed a rather volatile week up .87% at 96.36. Since inception, the index is down 3.64%.

The big winner for the week was retailer The Finish Line (FINL), up 58% on the heals of a settlement in the company's failed acquisition bid for Genesco. The stock popped despite announcing that q4 same store sales were down 6%.

Other Winners:
Tandy Brsnds (TBAC): +15.1%
Emerson Radio (MSN): +7.4%


Losers
Parlux Fragtances (PARL): -15.1%
FSI International (FSII): -11%
Richardson Electronics (RELL): -8.6%


Benchmarking The Index
The best way to measure The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index in terms of relative performance is via the Russell Microcap Index. Comparisons against the S&P 500, or any of the other commonly used benchmarks are simply not relevant.

The Russell Microcap Index
By Definition:*

The Russell Microcap Index measures the performance of the microcap segment of the U.S. equity market. It makes up less than 3% of the U.S. equity market. It includes 1000 of the smallest securities in the small-cap Russell 2000® Index based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership and it includes the next 1,000 securities.

Russell Microcap Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive and unbiased barometer for the microcap segment trading on national exchanges, while excluding lesser-regulated OTC bulletin board securities and pink-sheet stocks due to their failure to meet national exchange listing requirements. The Russell Microcap Index is completely reconstituted annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort performance and characteristics of the true microcap opportunity set.

Portfolio Characteristics
Average Market Cap($-WTD)$402 million
Median Market Cap: $193 million
Largest Company by Market Cap: $1.683 billion Smallest Company by Market Cap: $13 million
Source: Russell

Performance vs Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index
Since inception (2/12/08):
CS21Net/Net: -3.64%
Russell Micro: -7%

Week Ended 3/7/08:
CS21Net/Net: +.87%
Russell Micro: -4.5%

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies that comprise The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks following the date of this post.

Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index Down 3.1% for Week ended 2/29/08

The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index ended the week at 95.53, down 3.1%. Since inception (2/12/08), the index is down 4.47%. Much of the damage occurred today, as broad markets were hit hard.

Winners for the day included Medicinova (MNVS) up 4.4%, and Nu Horizons Electronics, up 2.2%. Losers outpaced winners by a 17 to 4 margin, and included Ditech Networks (DITC) down 9%, Emerson Radio (MSN) down 7.7% and Parlux Fragrances (PARL) down 7.1%.

The index is off to quite a start--launched less than 3 weeks ago, and already down nearly 4.5%. This is not unexpected given the attributes of index constituents, and volatile markets. Stay tuned for updates.

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies that comprise The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks following the date of this post.

Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index Flat for Week ended 2/22/08

The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index closed it's first full week at 98.62, flat versus last week's close. Since inception (2/12/08), the index is down 1.38%.

Winners for the week included Finish Line Inc (FINL), up 18.8%, Renovis (RNVS) up 7.9%, and Medicinova (MNVS) up 5.6%. Losers included Charles and Colvard (CTHR) down 13.8%, Replydyne (RDYN)down 13%, and Handelman (HDL) down 10%.

Price swings are wide in net/net land, and double digit gains or losses are not uncommon given the attributes of the typical net/net.

Selected Index Fundamentals
Average Market Cap: $109.7 million
Average Net Current Asset Value: $86.1 million
Market Cap/NCAV: 1.27
Total Market Cap of Index Members: $1.809 billion
Total Cash of Index Members: $1.303 billion

We've received many comments and inquiries about this index, and will attempt to respond to them all.

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies that comprise The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks
following the date of this post.

Introducing the Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index: The First Index of Companies Trading Below Net Current Asset Value

We’ve designed what we believe to be the first index of companies trading below their net current asset value. The main purpose of this index will be to track a passive portfolio of net/nets. This index is chock full of small companies many of which have been beaten down, and some of which may not survive. We’ve developed this index primarily as an attempt to gauge net/net performance using a basket approach.

The Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index is a market cap weighted index comprised of companies that met the following criteria at index inception on Tuesday, February 12th, 2008:

•Market Cap is below net current asset value, defined as:
Current Assets – Current Liabilities – all other long term liabilities (including preferred stock, and minority interest where applicable)

•Stock Price above $1.00 per share

•Companies have an operating business; acquisition companies were excluded

•Minimum average 100 day volume of at least 5000 shares (light we know, but welcome to the wonderful world of net/nets)

*Index constituents were selected by market cap. The index is comprised of the “largest” companies meeting the above criteria.

The Index is naïve in construction in that:

•It will be rebalanced annually, and companies no longer meeting the net/net criteria will remain in the index until annual rebalancing.

•Only bankruptcies, de-listings, or acquisitions will result in replacement

•Does not discriminate by industry weighting—some industries may have heavy weights.


Cheap Stocks 21 Net/Net Index Constituents and Weights (%, rounded):

Adaptec Inc(ADPT)18.72%
Computer Systems

Audiovox Corp(VOXX)12.20%
Electronics

Trans World Entertainment(TWMC)7.58%
Retail-Music and Video

Finish Line Inc(FINL)6.30%
Retail-Apparel

Nu Horizons Electronics(NUHC)5.76%
Electronics Wholesale

Richardson Electronics(RELL)5.09%
Electronics Wholesale

Pomeroy IT Solutions(PMRY)4.61%
IT

Ditech Networks(DITC)4.31%
Communication Equip

Parlux Fragrances(PARL)3.92%
Personal Products

InFocus Corp(INFS)3.81%
Computer Peripherals

Renovis Inc(RNVS)3.80%
Biotech

Leadis Technology Inc(LDIS)3.47%
Semiconductor-Integrated Circuits

Replidyne Inc(RDYN)3.31%
Biotech

Tandy Brands Accessories Inc(TBAC)2.94%
Apparel, Footwear, Accessories

FSI International Inc(FSII)2.87%
Semiconductor Equip

Anadys Pharmaceuticals Inc(ANDS)2.49%
Biotech

MediciNova Inc(MNOV)2.33%
Biotech

Emerson Radio Corp(MSN)1.71%
Electronics

Handleman Co(HDL)1.66%
Music- Wholesale

Chromcraft Revington Inc(CRC)1.62%
Furniture

Charles & Colvard Ltd(CTHR)1.50%
Jewel Wholesale


The initial value of the Cheap Stocks Index was 100, as of the close on 2/11/08. Initially, we’ll report the index value on a weekly basis.

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies mentioned. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks
following the date of this post.

Patience Wears Thin on LKI: Making Room in the Portfolio

Waiting for a net/net story to unfold is often as exciting as watching paint dry, or the grass grow. That was the pretty much the story with diamond company Lazare Kaplan Intl, which we recently unloaded. You may recall our recent research piece on LKI, which was in reaction to the company’s reverse/forward split designed to reduce shareholder roles. In our view, this was a prelude for LKI to go “private”.

Shares were up 31% since, when we closed the position last week. A nice gain, yes, but we originally purchased the shares in March. 2006 at $7.75, so our 26% gain came in 22 months, after several oscillations along the way.

Why did we pull the trigger, you ask? To make room in the portfolio; to free up cash for better opportunities. Lazare Kaplan is actually coming off several consecutive marginally profitable quarters, but we’ve come to believe that this company will always be (or be very close to) a net/net.

Plum Creek Timber
We also closed our position in timber giant Plum Creek Timber, in the $43.50 range. This was another move to free up some cash. Plum Creek performed fairly well for us over the 2+ years we owned it, but we believe it is trading a little rich right now. Perhaps we’ll add back in the future.

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies mentioned. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks following the date of this post.

Investment Lessons Learned From a Bully


Charlie was the consumate bully. One of the older kids in the neighborhood, and also the paperboy, he had a bad reputation and it was well earned. The event that occurred on one snowy day in our small quiet town in central NJ some 30 years ago can today be used as a metaphor for an important investment lesson.

We'd spent much of the day building a huge snow fort--my brother and I, Jimmy and Jon, brothers who lived across from us, and a few other assorted neighborhood kids. We could all fit inside this circular structure, but the walls were so high that we could not see out, save for a "window" or two built into the wall. Definitely the best snow fort we'd ever built.

But we soon realized that our snow structure's hours of existence were limited. Not because of the sun, but because of something much more menacing: Charlie. We realized that he was due to make his afternoon newspaper deliveries, and as soon as he saw our fort, he would very likely destroy it. At 15 or 16, Charlie was a big kid, and could severely damage our fort with one flying leap.

We thought quickly. If Charlie was going to take down our fort, he was going to do so at his own peril. We quickly loaded that snow fort with everything we could find--rakes, shovels, other garden implements standing upright, even a full size garden tractor. He might take down the fort that we spent all day building, but that bully was not going to walk away unscathed.

We hid in the bushes, and along came Charlie. He saw our snow fort, but could not see what was contained within. He stopped, he sprinted, he jumped, and landed, destroying our fort. How proud he must have been as he hit that wall of snow--until a split second later when he landed on a tractor, several garden implements, and half the contents of Jimmy and Jon's garage. Charlie got a big, painful surprise that snowy afternoon. What appeared to be a harmless, ultra white snow fort, was actually much more. It's contents could not be seen from the outside; hidden within it's walls were dangerous, unseen risks.

That day, Charlie the bully cried like a baby. I don't remember seeing him all that much after that. He didn't suffer any permanent damage, and in hindsight, I'm glad he was not injured. We all (I hope) learned important lessons that day.

Hopefully the investment lesson is clear. During those times of financial crisis, when companies are beaten down, we as investors have the propensity to be fooled by the "It's down 50%, it can't go any lower" sentiment. That's the time to be aware of what might really be contained within a given company's situation. Is their peril lurking behind snowy white walls? Is it really worth the risk?

Charlie, if you are out there, I'd bet you wouldn't go near the Radians (RDN), MBIA's (MBI), or other such companies that have been trounced, yet may still conceal the unexpected. There may ultimately be reward, but how much risk are you willing to take?

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies mentioned. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks following the date of this post.

Marty Whitman on MBIA and Radian


Marty Whitman is a legend in value investing circles, and yet he still continues to surprise. In his most recent letter to shareholders, a must read for value investors, he laid out his case for both MBIA and Radian:

THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MELTDOWN AND HOUSING COLLAPSE
TAVF is investing heavily in the common stocks of companies suffering through the current housing crisis. These companies include financial institutions, a homebuilder, a building supplier, land banks and investment builders. The Fund’s reasons for this investment program provide a good case study as to how Third Avenue’s “safe and cheap*” approach works in practice:First, the bad side of these investments:
1) The stock market pricing for these equity issues is chaotic. There is no way Fund management is able to pick a bottom for securities prices, or a near bottom.
2) Fund management has no good idea of how deep the crisis will become, or how long it will last. Our best guess is two to four years.

Second, the good side of these investments:
1) In each instance, TAVF is acquiring common stocks at meaningful discounts from readily ascertainable NAVs. In the case of certain financial institution
common stocks – MGIC Common, MBIA Common and Radian Common, the prices the Fund
is paying are no more that 40% of book value, or adjusted book value. For each of these companies, a normalized Return on Equity (equity equals book
value) (“ROE”) ranges from 8% to 14%. Assuming a 10% ROE sometime in the future, and no further dramatic deterioration in book value during the interim, probably a realistic assumption; and current pricing at 40% of book value, Third Avenue would
be paying only four times future normalized earning power. There seems to be a reasonable probability, too, that TAVF is really paying less than four times
normalized earnings, even assuming that future normalized earnings are fully taxed and even assuming some modest dilution of the common stocks.
2) Each common stock acquired, is acquired in a company which enjoys a strong financial position. While there can be no guarantees, the probabilitiesare that each of these companies will survive as solvent going concerns either without requiring
major access to capital markets for new funding, or by obtaining new funding from others on terms that are only modestly dilutive for TAVF. On December
10th, MBIA announced that it is obtaining $500 million of equity financing from Warburg Pincus; and another $500 million from a rights offering which Warburg Pincus will backstop, i.e.,underwrite. Assuming that Third Avenue participates
in the rights offering and also takes advantage of any oversubscription privileges, the capital infusion should be, at worst, only modestly dilutive for TAVF.
3) Each company seems very well managed.
4) It is possible that the crisis will become increasingly deep, and prolonged; or rating agencies will start to place great weight on soft, qualitative considerations. In those events, the companies might need capital infusions to
remain going concerns. TAVF has proposed to MBIA,Radian and USG managements that such infusions be in the form of equity, and that existing stockholders
provide the equity via pre-emptive rights offerings. MBIA proposes to raise $500 million via a rights offering. If this were to occur, and if other portfolio
companies were to follow the MBIA path, the capital infusions would be, for Third Avenue, mostly nondilutive, or anti–dilutive (if there are oversubscription
privileges). In the case of MBIA and Radian, it is crucial if they are to remain going concerns, that the national rating agencies continue to assign AAA and AA ratings, respectively, to each company’s bond insurance subsidiaries. As an aside, given current prices, TAVF would probably not lose money if Radian or MBIA
were to go into run-off rather than remain going concerns. Run-off, i.e., liquidation, simply is not a likely outcome, however.

In the past, Whitman has been a master in both distressed equity, and even distressed debt, with a keen ability to determine true value, post crisis. While Marty is one of our heroes, we for one don't have the stomach to go near either of these companies, or most other names in related sectors.

The game has changed since Marty wrote this letter, especially in the case of MBIA, but we are steering clear. Too much risk, we believe, and possibly another shoe or two yet to drop.

While we hope Marty Whitman is right in the end, we are staying on the sidelines.

*The author does not have positions in any of the companies mentioned, but does have a position in Third Avenue's Small Cap Value Fund. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. The author will not trade any of the securities mentioned (buy, sell, short) for at least two weeks following the date of this post.